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deciding not to take that option.Permitting thevessel to travelwith her cargo onboard toHamburg
would have involved further risks. The vessel's P&I cover had been withdrawn, some US$2 million
remained at the time outstanding with no serious prospect of repayment, and therewas always the
possibility of a serious accident occurring en route.
Duty arising under a ship mortgage
The alternative argument alleged that themortgageeswere inbreach of duty for interferingwith the
performance of the contract of carriage, without having an express power to do so and when the
contract of carriage did not of itself impair the security of themortgagee.
The argument derives from the principle that a shipowner mortgagor continues to be entitled to
manage and operate themortgaged vessel, notwithstanding themortgage, provided such commercial
operations do not prejudice or impair the mortgagee's security. A mortgagee who in these
circumstances interferes without lawful justificationmaybe restrainedby ormade liable in damages to
the third party, for example the shipper (TheMyrto [1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep 243, 253^254, per Brandon J).
In the present case the argument had been pressed too boldly and without regard to the context
outlined above, for it was suggested that a mortgagee is not entitled to interfere with the
mortgagor's commercial engagements unless specifically authorised. If such an argument were to
succeed it would result in all the powers and rights set out in the Deed of Covenant being overridden,
which is unthinkable. The mortgage is essentially a contractual arrangement, with the powers and
rights of the mortgagee set out in the appropriate documents, and also the circumstances when the
powers and rights may be exercised, the so called default events. Once a default event occurs a
designated power may be exercised, such as arresting the mortgaged ship, and provided the power is
exercised lawfully there canbe no further fetter or restriction by virtue of the fact that the exercise
of the power interferes with the commercial operations onwhich themortgaged ship is employed.
Concluding point
The case emphasises that the law of ship mortgages is based both on the general law relating to
mortgages and also specific legal provisions that are peculiar to themortgage of ships.
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FOB CONTRACT ^ LAYTIME ^ OPENING OF LETTER OF CREDIT ^
CONDITION PRECEDENT ^ SELLER'S DUTY TO LOAD
KronosWorldwide Ltd v Sempra Oil Trading SARL
[2004] EWCACiv 3
Facts
This case revolves around a single question of law ^ `whether (subject towaiver) laytime did not run
under the contract in question until after a letter of credit had been opened'.
Kronos (seller) had agreed to deliver gasoil to Sempra (buyer) F`OB one safe port/berth Constanza'.
Payment was to be secured by a letter of credit which under the contract was `to be opened
promptly through a first class bank'. The contract further provided that any demurrage payable
would be paid for by the sellers. In respect of the cargo in question, the loading range was 20^30
June 2001. Kronos indicated to Sempra that it was unable to supply the gasoil during that time due
to slippageproblems and asked to postpone delivery to1^5 July. Sempra did not agreebut stated that
it intended to narrow the vessel's arrival to 28^30 June.
The Spear I arrived at Constanza on 28 June but loading did not commence until 9 July and was
completed on 11 July. For the purposes of the appeal see below, it was assumed that notice of
readiness was given on 28 June. Laytime thus commenced on 28 June and, under the contract,
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expired on 30 June.On thatbasis, Sempra claimed that Kronoswas liable to paydemurrage for11days
1hour and16 minutes (a claim totalling US$160,265.26).
Kronos refused, relying on the fact that Sempra was in breach of contract for failing to open the
letter of credit prior to the arrival of the ship. The letter of credit was not opened until 5 July.
Kronos's case was that the opening of a letter of credit was a condition precedent to any duty on its
part to load cargo and that laytime therefore could not commence until a reasonable time after the
provision of the letter of credit.
The High Court agreed with Sempra that it should not be assumed that laytime under the contract
would necessarily runwhen Kronos first became obliged to load.The judge said that the fact laytime
may have started to run before the provision of the letter of credit was n`othing to the point'. The
judge thought that the obligations may be viewed separately, and the fact that one obligation (the
duty to open a letter of credit) was a condition precedent did not preclude another obligation (the
duty as regards laytime) to arise.The court considered that to equate the seller's duty to load with
the commencement of laytime would involve a`n impermissible elision of Sempra's obligation for
demurrage under the charterparty at which the demurrage provision in the contract is aimed with
the separate contractual obligation between Sempra and Kronos arising from Sempra's failure
promptly to open the letter of credit'. Judgment was thus entered for the buyer.
Kronos appealed against that decision.
Decision
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. It held that it was incorrect in principle to suggest that the
laytime and demurrage provisions of the contract can be separated from the contractual provision
requiringpresentation of a letter of credit.Mance LJ held that the opening of the letter of creditmust
be a condition precedent to Kronos's duty to load. The court's view was that the laytime and the
provision of the letter of credit bear on the same subjectmatter. Laytime refers to the time allowed
for the loading operations whilst the provision of a letter of credit is a condition precedent to the
seller's duty to perform any part of the loading operation. It was not correct to try to distinguish
the physical parting with possession of the cargo from other aspects of the loading operation.
Comment
The fundamental question in the present case was whether it was right to construe the laytime and
demurrage clauses as separate from the provisions on the opening of the letter of credit.The High
Court saw the two issues as distinctive, perhaps on the basis that in a n`ormal' situation, the laytime
and demurrage provisions would be lodged in the contract of carriage whilst the letter of credit
provisions would be lodged in the contract of sale. In the present case, though, both sets of
obligations are found in the contract of sale. The Court of Appeal was thus correct to hold that it
would be artificial and incorrect to find the two sets of contractual provisions as unrelated.
The court also sawno incongruity in recognising that, by tying laytime/demurrage provisions to the
stipulation for a letter of credit, laytime under the sale contract between the buyer and seller may
begin at a different time to laytimeunder buyer's sub-sale (if any) or under the original charterparty
(the contract of carriage). The court drew attention to the fact that it was always possible if
different contracts had different laycan dates. It was the buyer's own responsibility to ensure that
its contractual relations (as regards laytime/demurrage) are capable of operating on a proper back-
to-back basis. It is difficult to find fault with the principle there ^ the laytime provisions in the
contract of sale must be construed within the four corners of that contract. Regard need not be
had as to parallel or back-to-back relationships. Nonetheless, the present case does reveal a
serious gap in existing practice. The fact that such p`roper back-to-back relations' are seldom
provided for in standard form contracts of sale (especially on FOB terms) would seem to suggest a
belief that the term of laytime is generally an autonomous term, to be construed in the context of
the original contract of carriage (eg the charterparty) without reference to other provisions in the
contract of sale. Such an assumption is unsustainable in the light of the present case. Lawyers
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drafting the sale contracts (and, possibly, the contracts of carriage) must take heed that p`roper
back-to-back relations' are provided for.
Itwas also argued that laytime canrun anddemurrage accrue despite the failureby thebuyer to open
a letter of credit, because the seller could exercise a set-off against the buyer if it could show that it
had cargo to loadwhich it did not loadbecause therewas no letter of credit in place.The High Court
saw no difficulty, in principle, with that proposition.Chambers J reasoned:
`There is no reason in principle why the occurrence of a condition precedent should not result in an
obligation to be responsible for an expense incurred before the condition occurred. For instance,
expensesmay have been incurred in connectionwith an anticipated contract which the other party to
the eventual contract undertakes to reimburse in the event that a condition ismet at a later time.'
It is clear that such a reasoning would notwork in the area of international sale contracts, especially
FOB contracts where there aremutual obligations between the parties. Indeed the Court of Appeal
rejected this analysis, stating that it does not give proper effect to the principle that the provision of
the letter of credit is a condition precedent to the seller's duty to load. As far as the court was
concerned, it was not possible to disregard the link between the duty to open a letter of credit and
the duty to load (and thus trigger the laytime provisions). The court emphasised that the link was
important because it allowed the parties to know where they stood, contemporaneously. The
mutuality of the duties in the FOB contract means that until one duty is performed, the
corresponding duty on the other party need not commence. Until the letter of credit has been
opened, the seller is fully entitled to do nothing. After all, for all the seller knows, the letter of
credit might never be opened.This is clearly in line with the requirements of commercial certainty.
Thus, itwould notbe appropriate for thebuyer to argue that theprovision of the letter of credit as a
condition could be satisfied retrospectively.
JC
REINSURANCE ^ DUTYOF UTMOST GOOD FAITH ^ PRE-CONTRACT ^
MATERIALITY ^ INDUCEMENT ^ WAIVER ^ AFFIRMATION
WISE Underwriting Agency Ltd and others v Grupo Nacional Provincial SA
[2003] EWHC 3038, English Commercial Court
Facts
The assured, Perfumeria Ultra SA de CV (Perfumeria), was a retailer of luxury goods in Cancun,
Mexico. Perfumeria obtained transit cover for goods to be shipped from Miami to Cancun from the
insurers,GrupoNacional Provincial SA (GNP).GNP then approached its reinsurancebrokers,Grupo
Internacional de Reaseguro (GIR), to assist them in procuring reinsurance.GIR, in turn, approached
Collard & Partners (Collards), who were London reinsurance brokers.Collards held an open cover
under which they could introduce business to reinsurers,WISE Underwriting Agency (WISE), from
various cedants.WISE had liberty to accept or decline the business introduced by Collards under the
open cover.
During the introduction of the risk toWISE,GIR prepared slips defining the risk under the original
policy.The English version of the slipwas sent to Collards and shown toWISE but the Spanish version
was not.There was a discrepancy between the English and Spanish versions of the slips. The latter
included a section stating that the goods shipped included Rolexes and other high-value brands of
watches, while the English version (the one sent to Collards) did not. In the English version, the
word c`locks' was used throughout to describe the goods in transit. The reinsurance agreement
became effective as of 31December 2000.
During thenightof 3/4April 2001, a quantityof goodswas stolen from a container parkedoutside the
warehouse premises of Perfumeria in Cancun.The goods stolen included over US$700,000 worth of
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